I. Introduction
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD), the aim of which is to share a random secret string of digits between two parties, has been said to rest on the principle of quantum mechanics since the time of its proposal [1] . However, proofs of the security against a reasonably wide class of attacks were obtained only recently on the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1] . Since a preliminary report on such a proof of the security was given by Mayers [2] , there have been considerable efforts to refine, strengthen or support this result in the literature. Especially, Shor and Preskill [3] made a remarkable observation that a Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum code had been implicitly used in the BB84 protocol and if the fidelity of the incorporated Calderbank-Shor-Steane code goes to unity sufficiently fast as the code-length n grows large, then the security of the BB84 protocol will be ensured in the sense that the mutual information between the shared key and the data obtained by the eavesdropper approaches zero. They used CSS codes that meet the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, the existence of which was proved in [4] , to established the security, and also suggested a higher rate, which they called the Shannon rate, is achievable. However, no proof of the existence of codes achieving the high rate was given. This work shows codes of 'balanced' weight spectra (or type spectra, so to speak) in Lemma 1 achieve it. Analysis of the security is given in the full manuscript (available at http://xxx.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0308029).
II. Calderbank-Shor-Steane Codes
A quantum system carrying digits will be represented by a Hilbert space H with d = dim H, where d is a prime (often assumed to be 2) and {0, . . . , d − 1} is regarded as the finite field d = /d . In the BB84 protocol, the sender transmits digits from d = {0, . . . , d}, which are encoded into an orthonomal basis {|j } j=d−1 j=0 of H or the conjugate basis {|j } j=d−1 j=0 ⊆ H, where |j = U |j , j ∈ d , and U is the Fourier transform defined by U = d −1/2 È j,l∈ d ω jl |j l| with ω being a primitive d-th root of unity. We define unitaries X and Z by X|j = ω j |j , Z|j = ω j |j , j ∈ d .
The information processing in the BB84 protocol is classical, not quantum mechanical, except the use of the conjugate bases {|j } j=d−1 j=0 and {|j } j=d−1 j=0 . However, Shor and Preskill argued that the security is proved by evaluating the fidelity of quantum error-correcting codes underlying the protocol. The codes are called Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes. We restrict ourselves to a class of CSS codes of simple structure for the purpose of analysis. Let X (x 1 ,...,xn) denote X x 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ X xn , etc. Given a classical code C ⊆ n d with C ⊆ C ⊥ , where C ⊥ is the dual of C with respect to the bilinear form È i xiyi, a simultaneous eigenspace of the commuting operators X x Z z ,
x, z ∈ C, is called a CSS code. Given a set of coset representatives Γ for n d /C ⊥ , with a suitable decoding (recovery) operator, the CSS code can correct errors X x Z z for x ∈ Γ and z ∈ Γ, so that the decoding error probability of the quantum code is upper-bounded by 1 − Pr[X n ∈ Γ and Z n ∈ Γ] ≤ Pr[X n ∈ Γ c ] + Pr[Z n ∈ Γ c ] with c denoting complement.
III. Reliable Codes
The type of a sequence y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ n d is denoted by Py, and for a fixed type Q, we put T n Q = {y ∈ n d | Py = Q}. Given a set C ⊆ n d , we put MQ(C ) = |{y ∈ C | Py = Q}| for types Q. The next lemma is analogous to a result in [5] .
Lemma 1 Let d ≥ 3 be a prime. There exists a κdimensional subspace C of n d such that C ⊆ C ⊥ and for any type Q of sequences of length n, Q = P0n ,
. Let a number 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 be given. There exists a sequence of pairs {(Cn, Γn)}, each consisting of a self-orthogonal code Cn ⊆ n d with n−2 dim d Cn ≥ nR and a set Γn of coset representatives of n d /C ⊥ n , such that for any probability distribution P XZ on X = d × d ,
where P X and P Z are the marginal distributions of P XZ , E(R, P X , P Z ) = min{E * (R, P X ), E * (R, P Z )},
|t| + = max{t, 0}, H and D denote the entropy and the Kullback-Leibler information with logarithms of base d, respectively, and the minimization with respect to Q is taken over all probability distributions on d .
The quantum code can protect d k -dimensional Hilbert space where k = n − 2 dim d Cn. Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 are also true for d = 2 with slight changes of the statements.
